Abstract. We analyze the set-theoretic strength of determinacy for levels of the Borel hierarchy of the form Σ 0 1+α+3 , for α < ω1. Well-known results of H. Friedman and D.A. Martin have shown this determinacy to require α+1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom, but we ask what additional ambient set theory is strictly necessary. To this end, we isolate a family of Π1-reflection principles, Π1-RAPα, whose consistency strength corresponds exactly to that of Σ 0 1+α+3 -Determinacy, for α < ω CK 1 . This yields a characterization of the levels of L by or at which winning strategies in these games must be constructed. When α = 0, we have the following concise result: the least θ so that all winning strategies in Σ 0 4 games belong to L θ+1 is the least so that L θ |= "P(ω) exists + all wellfounded trees are ranked". §1. Introduction. Given a set A ⊆ ω ω of sequences of natural numbers, consider a game, G(A), where two players, I and II, take turns picking elements of a sequence x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . of naturals. Player I wins the game if the sequence obtained belongs to A; otherwise, II wins. For a collection Γ of subsets of ω ω , Γ determinacy, which we abbreviate Γ-DET, is the statement that for every A ∈ Γ, one of the players has a winning strategy in G(A). It is a much-studied phenomenon that Γ -DET has mathematical strength: the bigger the pointclass Γ, the stronger the theory required to prove Γ -DET. Allowing Γ to range over pointclasses in Baire space, we obtain a natural measuring rod for the strength of theories ranging from weak fragments of second order arithmetic, up to the large cardinal axioms of higher set theory.
Martin have shown this determinacy to require α+1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom, but we ask what additional ambient set theory is strictly necessary. To this end, we isolate a family of Π1-reflection principles, Π1-RAPα, whose consistency strength corresponds exactly to that of Σ 0 1+α+3 -Determinacy, for α < ω CK 1 . This yields a characterization of the levels of L by or at which winning strategies in these games must be constructed. When α = 0, we have the following concise result: the least θ so that all winning strategies in Σ 0 4 games belong to L θ+1 is the least so that L θ |= "P(ω) exists + all wellfounded trees are ranked". §1. Introduction. Given a set A ⊆ ω ω of sequences of natural numbers, consider a game, G(A), where two players, I and II, take turns picking elements of a sequence x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . of naturals. Player I wins the game if the sequence obtained belongs to A; otherwise, II wins. For a collection Γ of subsets of ω ω , Γ determinacy, which we abbreviate Γ-DET, is the statement that for every A ∈ Γ, one of the players has a winning strategy in G(A). It is a much-studied phenomenon that Γ -DET has mathematical strength: the bigger the pointclass Γ, the stronger the theory required to prove Γ -DET. Allowing Γ to range over pointclasses in Baire space, we obtain a natural measuring rod for the strength of theories ranging from weak fragments of second order arithmetic, up to the large cardinal axioms of higher set theory.
Our interest in this paper is a fine calibration of the strength of determinacy for levels Σ 0 α of the Borel hierarchy. Results of this kind can be traced along two main trajectories. On the one hand, in reverse mathematics, the strength of determinacy is measured in terms of provability: An optimal result would be an isolation of some subsystem of second order arithmetic provably equivalent to Γ-DET over some weak base theory. On the other hand, in set theory, determinacy strength is measured in terms of consistency strength: An optimal result would be a characterization of some minimal model whose existence is equivalent (again over some weak base theory) to Γ-DET.
On both fronts, the question of strength for the lowest levels of the Borel hierarchy has been settled. Σ 0 1 -DET was early on proved by Gale and Stewart [5] and later shown by Steel [15] to be equivalent over ACA 0 to ATR 0 ; and an
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analysis by Blass [2] implies that Σ 0 1 -DET is equivalent to the existence of a wellfounded model of KP+ Infinity, so that winning strategies in Σ 0 1 games are constructed at or before ω CK 1 in L. Tanaka [16] refined Wolfe's [19] original proof of Σ 0 2 -DET and showed this determinacy to be equivalent to an axiom asserting the stabilization of Σ 1 1 -monotone inductive operators; this in turn was inspired by work of Solovay (see [8] ) from which follows a characterization of the least level of L witnessing determinacy in terms of the closure ordinal of such operators.
Already at the level of Σ 0 3 -DET, a calibration of determinacy strength in terms of reverse mathematics becomes problematic. Welch [17] has closely studied this strength, pushing through Davis's [3] proof under minimal assumptions, and establishing that Σ [12] that no reversal is possible, in the strong sense that Σ [18] went on to characterize the least ordinal β so that winning strategies for all such games belong to L β+1 in terms of certain nonstandard models of V = L.
Montalbán and Shore go a bit further up the Borel hierarchy, analyzing levels of the difference hierarchy on Π In this paper, we consider the next level, Σ 0 4 , and more generally, levels of the form Σ 0 1+α+3 for α < ω CK 1 . By an early result of Friedman [4] , full Borel determinacy requires ω 1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom, and even Σ 0 5 -DET is not provable in second order arithmetic nor indeed, full ZFC − (ZFC minus the Power Set Axiom). Martin later improved this to Σ 0 4 -DET and proved the corresponding generalization for higher levels of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy; combining Montalbán-Shore's fine analysis [12] of (n−Π 0 3 ) -DET with Martin's inductive proof [10] of Borel determinacy, we may summarize the bounds for these levels known prior to our work as follows. Theorem 1.1 (Martin, Friedman, Montalbán-Shore). For α < ω 1 , n < ω,
Here Z is Zermelo Set Theory without Choice (including Comprehension, but excluding Replacement). Again the superscript "−" indicates removal of the Power Set Axiom. Thus, α + 1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom are necessary to prove Σ 0 1+α+3 -DET. However, the question remained as to what additional ambient set theory is strictly necessary. More precisely, can one isolate a natural fragment of "Z − + Σ 1 -Replacement + P α+1 (ω) exists" whose consistency strength is precisely that of Σ 0 1+α+3 -DET? Furthermore, can one characterize in a meaningful way the least level of L at which winning strategies in these games are constructed?
In this paper, we show this is the case. We introduce a family of natural reflection principles, Π 1 -RAP α , and show in a weak base theory that the existence of a wellfounded model of Π 1 -RAP α is equivalent to Σ 0 1+α+3 -DET, for α < ω CK 1 . In particular, we show that the least ordinal θ α so that winning strategies in all Σ 0 1+α+3 games belong to L θα+1 is precisely the least so that L θα |= Π 1 -RAP α . To give the reader a sense of the where these principles lie in terms of strength, we state at the outset a chain of nonreversible consistency strength implications that will be proved in the course of the paper. It turns out that in the V = L context, Π 1 -RAP α is equivalent to an easily stated axiom concerning the existence of ranking functions for open games, so that the ordinals θ α can be rather simply described. In particular, letting θ = θ 0 , we have the following: L θ is the least level of L satisfying "P(ω) exists, and all wellfounded trees on P(ω) are ranked."
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by reviewing some basic facts about admissibility theory and L. In Section 3, after introducing the abstract principles Π 1 -RAP(U ), we focus on Π 1 -RAP(ω), proving some basic consequences and obtaining useful equivalents in the V = L context. In Section 4, we connect these principles to determinacy, in particular proving Σ 0 4 -DET assuming the existence of a wellfounded model of Π 1 -RAP(ω). In Section 5, we prove our lower bound in the case of Σ 0 4 -DET, making heavy use of the results of Section 3. Section 6 carries out the analogous arguments for levels of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy of the form Σ 0 α+3 , for 1 < α < ω CK 1 . We conclude in Section 7 with some remarks concerning the complexity of winning strategies. §2. Preliminaries: admissibility, L, and illfounded models. The main results of this paper concern certain weak subsystems of ZFC. We begin by reviewing these and cataloguing those facts that we require in the sequel.
Let Γ be a class of formulas in the language of set theory. Γ-Comprehension (often called Γ-Separation) is the axiom scheme containing universal closures of all formulas of the form
where φ is a k + 1-ary formula in Γ.
Γ-Collection is the scheme consisting of the universal closures of formulas
for k + 2-ary formulas in Γ. In this paper, Γ will always be one of ∆ 0 or Σ 1 . We take as our background theory BST (Basic Set Theory), which consists of the axioms of Extensionality, Foundation, Pair, Union, ∆ 0 -Comprehension, and the statement that Cartesian products exist. Unless otherwise stated, all of the models we consider satisfy at least BST (so "transitive model" really means "transitive model of BST").
Kripke-Platek Set Theory, KP, is BST together with the axiom scheme of ∆ 0 -Collection; note that all axioms in the schema of Σ 1 -Collection and ∆ 1 -Comprehension are then provable in KP. A transitive set M is called admissible if the structure (M, ∈) satisfies KP. KPI 0 is the theory BST together with the assertion that every set x belongs to an admissible set; KPI is the union of KP and KPI 0 . The standard reference for admissible set theory is Barwise's [1] .
The most important feature of admissible sets for our purposes is their ability to correctly identify wellfounded relations.
Proposition 2.1. Let M be an admissible set, and suppose T ∈ M is a tree. Then T is wellfounded if and only if there is a ranking function ρ ∈ M , that is, a map ρ : T → ON M such that ρ(s) < ρ(t) whenever s t for s, t ∈ T ; in particular, {s ∈ T | T s is wellfounded} is Σ 1 -definable over M .
Here T s = {t ∈ T | s ⊆ t or t ⊆ s}. Note however that T ∈ M may be illfounded even though no infinite branch through T belongs to M .
Our determinacy strength lower bounds require some basic fine structure theory of L. We therefore regard Gödel's L as stratified into Jensen's levels J α , and will also make reference to the auxiliary S-hierarchy further stratifying the J-hierarchy: S 0 = ∅, S α+1 is the image of S α ∪ {S α } under a finite list of binary operations generating the rudimentary functions, and we set, for limit ordinals λ, J λ = S λ = α<λ S α . In particular, we index the J α by limit ordinals, ON ∩J α = α for all limit α, and when ω · α = α, we have L α = J α .
The following definition/theorem summarizes all of the fine structural facts we require. For details and proofs, see [14] . Theorem 2.2. Every J α is a model of BST. Moreover, there are Σ 1 formulas σ, τ , φ, ψ so that for all limit α, 1. For all β < α and x ∈ J α , x = S β iff J α |= σ(x, β). Note that by upwards absoluteness of Σ 1 formulas, every Σ 1 statement true of parameters in J α also is true in all J β for β > α; consequently, the canonical wellorder of J β extends that of J α , and h Jα 1 (a) = h J β 1 (a) when the former exists. By a typical abuse of notation, we write h
<ω . When ρ Jα 1 = β we say J α projects to β.
An ordinal α is called admissible if J α = L α is an admissible set. The least admissible ordinal greater than ω is the Church-Kleene ordinal ω CK 1 . Note that L ω CK 1 projects to ω. More generally, letting ω x 1 be the least non-computable ordinal relative to the real x, we have that ω
is admissible. Note that whenever there is a real x so that α is the least admissible ordinal with x ∈ J α , we have ρ Proof. If ρ Jα 1 < α, then it is a cardinal of J α . Suppose towards a contradiction that ρ Jα 1 < κ. By (4) of Theorem 2.2, there is a finite set of ordinals p so that α ⊆ h
But now there is a map from ρ Jα 1 onto τ definable over J γ , contradicting the fact that τ is a cardinal in J α .
Our methods rely on an analysis of illfounded models of fragments of set theory. Recall any model M = M, ε in the language of set theory has a unique largest downward ε-closed submodel on which ε is wellfounded, the wellfounded part of M, denoted wfp(M). When ε is extensional on M , we identify wfp(M) with its transitive isomorph, and denote wfo(M) = wfp(M) ∩ ON. A model M of BST is an ω-model if ω ∈ wfo(M). Theorem 2.2 concerns transitive sets of the form J α , but we will need its consequences to hold even for illfounded models of V = L. We therefore officially define "V = L" to be the theory consisting of the following:
• There is no largest ordinal.
• Every set x belongs to some S β ; in particular, for all limit α, J α exists.
• Theorem 2.2 holds for the fixed Σ 1 formulas σ, τ, φ, ψ; moreover, the same theorem holds with V in place of J α .
Note V = L is a recursive theory. When working with an illfounded ω-model M of V = L, we refer to M's versions of the fine structural objects in the obvious way, e.g. h stacked on top. An important feature of this picture is overspill ; it is an immediate consequence of acceptability.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose M is an ω-model of V = L with β = wfo(M) and that κ ∈ L β is the largest cardinal of L β . Say X ∈ M is a nonstandard code if X ⊆ κ codes a linear order of κ so that M has an isomorphism from X onto some nonstandard ordinal of M. Then {X ∈ M \ L β | X is a nonstandard code} is nonempty, and has no < M L -least element. At center stage in this paper is the Power Set Axiom, which asserts that for every set X there exists a set P(X) whose elements are precisely the subsets of X. We consider restricted instances of the Power Set Axiom of the form "P α (ω) exists" for fixed α < ω 1 (here P α+1 (ω) = P(P α (ω)) and P λ (ω) = α<λ P α (ω) for limit λ). Whenever we say M |= "P α (ω) exists", M will always be an ω-model so that α is computable relative to some real x ∈ M. In this situation, α ∈ wfo(M), and it makes sense to regard this axiom as first-order (possibly in parameter x) in the language of set theory.
We conclude this section with a remark concerning the base theory. Since the main results of this paper involve models of fragments of set theory (including instances of the Power Set Axiom), it is natural to work in a suitably weak set theory, and the strongest assumption used in the proof of our main result is closure under the next admissible set (see Theorems 5.1 and 6.6). These proofs are therefore carried out in KPI 0 . However, calibrations of determinacy strength are traditionally done in second order arithmetic, and our results can be so formulated. Since the consequences of KPI 0 for second order arithmetic are precisely those of Π 1 1 -CA 0 , our main theorem, rephrased in the language of second order arithmetic, is provable in the latter theory:
1+α+3 (x) -DET is equivalent to the existence of a real coding a wellfounded model (M, ∈) in the language of set theory so that x ∈ M , and (M, ∈) |= Π 1 -RAP α . §3. The Π 1 -Reflection to Admissibles Principle. We now define the main theory of interest in this paper.
Definition 3.1. Let U be a transitive set. The Π 1 -Reflection to Admissibles Principle for U (denoted Π 1 -RAP(U )) is the assertion that P(U ) exists, together with the following axiom scheme, for all Π 1 formulae φ(u) in the language of set theory: Suppose Q ⊆ P(U ) is a set and φ(Q) holds. Then there is an admissible set M so that
• M |= φ(Q).
We chose this particular formulation for its simplicity. The sets U we consider are sufficiently well-behaved that Π 1 -RAP(U ) gives a bit more.
Say U admits power tuple coding if there is a bijective map c : P(U ) <ω → P(U ) so that the relations a ∈ c(s), a ∈ c −1 (x) i , and c(s) = x are all ∆ 0 ({U }) (that is, definable from the parameter U with all quantifiers bounded). Note then that if M is transitive satisfying BST and U ∈ M , then any set Q ⊆ P(U ) <ω in M can be coded by a set Q ⊆ P(U ) in M .
Lemma 3.2. Suppose U is a transitive set that admits power tuple coding, and
Then there is an admissible set M so that
• U ∈ M and M |= "P(U ) exists".
Proof. First note that given Q ⊂ P(U ), the relations u = U and v = Q are both ∆ 0 -definable from Q = Q∪ {U }, and this allows us refer to the coding map
<ω is given, and (∀x)ψ(Q 1 , x) holds, where ψ is ∆ 0 . Let Q = c[Q 1 ]; the given Π 1 statement is equivalent to
This can be phrased as a Π 1 (Q ) statement and so can be reflected to an admissible set M where it holds ofQ = Q ∩ M . Note then by absoluteness of the coding map c, we have c
Similar uses of coding allow us to reflect statements involving finite lists of parameters p 1 , . . . , p m , Q 1 , . . . , Q n ; that p i ∩ M = p i follows from transitivity of M and the assumption that U ∈ M . Finally, we can ensure M |= "P(U ) exists" by including P(U ) as one of the
We will first be concerned mainly with Π 1 -RAP(ω), which we abbreviate simply as Π 1 -RAP. Π 1 -RAP does not imply ∆ 0 -Collection, so cannot prove KP. However, it does prove many Σ 1 consequences of admissibility. For example, from the following lemma, we have Σ 1 -Recursion along wellfounded relations on P(ω). Recall a relation R is wellfounded if every nonempty subset of its domain has an R-minimal element. For binary R and a ∈ dom(R), let pred R (a) = {b ∈ dom(R) | bRa}, and tc R (a) denote the downwards R-closure of an element a ∈ dom(R),
Lemma 3.3. Work in Π 1 -RAP and suppose R is a wellfounded binary relation on P(ω) <ω . Suppose further that φ(u, v, w) is a Σ 1 formula that provably in KP defines the graph of a binary class function G. Then for every Q ⊆ P(ω) <ω , there is a function F : dom(R) → V so that for all a ∈ dom(R),
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that R is wellfounded, but Q is such that no total function F : dom(R) → V as in the lemma exists. This is a Π 1 statement in parameters R, Q, so by Π 1 -RAP and Lemma 3.2, reflects to an admissible set M satisfying "P(ω) exists".
Working in M , define the map F fromR,Q in the usual way:
The fact that M |= KP ensures this definition can be expressed in a Σ 1 fashion over M . Since we reflected a failure of this instance of Σ 1 -Recursion to M , there must be some y ∈ dom(R) so that F (y) does not exist. Consider the set
We have D nonempty; note though, that we needn't have D ∈ M . By wellfoundedness of R, let y 0 ∈ D be R-minimal. It follows that in M , F (y) is defined whenever yRy 0 , so F is defined on tcR(y 0 ) = yRy0 tcR(y). By Σ 1 -Replacement in M , we have thatf = F tcR(y 0 ) exists in M . But thisf witnesses the fact that F (y 0 ) exists, a contradiction.
For a set X, DC X denotes the Axiom of Dependent Choices for X. This weak choice principle states: if R is a binary relation on X so that for every a ∈ dom(R), there is some b with bRa, then there is an infinite sequence a n n∈ω so that a n+1 Ra n for all n.
Corollary 3.4. Assume Π 1 -RAP and DC R . Then whenever T is a tree on P(ω), either T has an infinite branch, or T has a rank function, that is, a map ρ : T → ON such that ρ(s) < ρ(t) whenever s t.
Proof. Suppose T is a tree on P(ω) with no infinite branch. By DC R , the relation is wellfounded on T . Apply Σ 1 -Recursion with the function
It turns out that the statement that all wellfounded trees on P(ω) are ranked is equivalent to Π 1 -RAP in the V = L context. Besides having intrinsic interest, this fact will be useful for our determinacy strength lower bounds.
Theorem 3.5 (joint with Itay Neeman). Let V = L and assume ω 1 exists, and that every tree on P(ω) is either illfounded or ranked. Then Π 1 -RAP holds; moreover, every instance of Π 1 -RAP is witnessed by some L α with α countable.
Proof. We may assume ω 2 does not exist, since otherwise Π 1 -RAP follows immediately. Suppose Q ⊆ P(ω) and that φ(Q) holds for some Π 1 formula φ. Let τ > ω 1 be sufficiently large that Q ∈ J τ . Let T be the tree of attempts to build a complete, consistent theory of a model M so that
• M is illfounded,
In slightly more detail: Let L * be the language of set theory together with constants {d n } n∈ω ∪ {a n } n∈ω ∪ {t, q}. Fix some standard coding σ → #σ of sentences in the language of L * so that #σ > k whenever d k appears in σ. All nodes in T are pairs of the form f, g , where f : n → {0, 1} and g : n → τ ∪P(ω), and the set {σ | f (#σ) = 1} is a finite theory in L * , consistent with the following:
• "t is an ordinal, q is a set of reals, and q ∈ S t ".
• V = L + φ(q) + "ω 1 exists and ω 1 ∈ t".
• µ → ψ(a #µ ), for sentences µ of the form (∃x)(x ∈ t ∨ x ⊂ ω) ∧ ψ(x). The point of the last clause is to have the a i serve as Henkin constants witnessing statements asserting existence of a real or of an ordinal below t. Finally, the function g is required to assign values in P(ω) ∪ τ to the Henkin constants in a way compatible with the theory; in particular, respecting the theory's order for elements of t (so that f (#(a i ∈ a j ∈ t)) = 1 implies g(i) < g(j) < τ ), membership of reals in Q (so that f (#(a i ∈ q)) = 1 implies g(i) ∈ Q), and membership of naturals in reals (f (#(n ∈ a i )) = 1 implies n ∈ g(i)).
Suppose T is illfounded. A branch through T then yields f giving a complete and consistent theory in L * together with assignment of constants g. Let M be the term model obtained from this theory. By construction, M is illfounded, M |= V = L, and settingQ = {g(i) | a
t ; moreover, by the assignment of elements of τ to terms below t, we have that M has wellfounded part containing
Now suppose towards a contradiction that T is not illfounded. Since T is clearly coded by a tree on P(ω), we have that T is ranked. Let ρ : T → ON be the ranking function. We construct a branch through T using the function ρ; f will be the characteristic function of the complete theory of J ρ(∅) , interpreting t by τ , q by Q, and inductively choosing values g(i) in τ ∪ P(ω) to be < L -least witnessing existential statements holding in J ρ(∅) . All that remains is to decide on interpretations for the constants d n , corresponding to the descending sequence of ordinals. So let x 0 = ρ(∅), and having chosen the fragment s of the branch up to k, let x k+1 = ρ(s). Then interpret d i in the theory by x i .
At each finite stage of the above construction, the theory chosen is satisfied under the appropriate interpretation in J ρ(∅) , so we may always extend the branch by one step. But then {x k | k ∈ ω} is an infinite descending sequence of ordinals, a contradiction.
We remark that with some extra work, the V = L assumption can be replaced with more natural hypotheses. Namely, we have the converse of Lemma 3.3: If DC R holds and we have Σ 1 -Recursion along wellfounded relations on P(ω), then Π 1 -RAP holds. The extra assumption of Σ 1 -Recursion guarantees the existence of all levels of the hierarchy of sets constructible relative to the parameter set Q; the argument of Theorem 3.5 may then be carried out inside L(Q) to give the desired instance of Π 1 -RAP. (DC R is important in part to ensure the existence branches through illfounded trees.)
Proof. Work in M . By Lemma 3.3, whenever A ⊆ P(ω) codes a prewellorder of P(ω), there is an ordinal α so that α = otp(P(ω)/ ≡ A , < A ), and L α exists. Since P(ω) exists, there is a ∆ 0 prewellorder of P(ω) in order type ω 1 , so L ω1 exists. It follows that L |= "ω 1 exists". So it's sufficient to show that every tree on P(ω) in L is either ranked or illfounded in L.
So let T be a tree on
Note that assuming KP + "P(ω) exists" + Σ 1 -Comprehension, this theory reflects from V to L, and if α is least so that α > ω
Similarly, by the last sentence of the same theorem combined with Corollary 3.4, Π 1 -RAP implies the existence of levels of L satisfying KP + "P(ω) exists"; by Proposition 2.3, such levels automatically satisfy ρ 1 > ω. Taken all together, we have established those implications of Theorem 1.2 between (1), (4), and (5). §4. Proving Determinacy. In this section, we prove a key lemma connecting the principles Π 1 -RAP(U ) to determinacy for certain infinite games, and use this lemma to give a proof of Σ ω , either I has a winning strategy in G(A; ω <ω ), or else there is a ∆ 1 -definable winning strategy for II. Since we aren't assuming ∆ 1 -Comprehension, it is possible that II's definable strategy will not be a set, and indeed, this scenario must occur in minimal models of Π 1 -RAP. Thus the hypothesis that guarantees determinacy of all Σ 0 4 games is the existence of such a model (Note that this situation is in complete analogy with that of Σ 0 1 -DET and models of KP; see [2] ).
We first recall some basic definitions and terminology. Fix a set X. By a tree on X we mean a set T ⊆ X <ω closed under initial segments. Let [T ] denote the set of infinite branches of T ; for s ∈ T , T s denotes the set {t ∈ T | t ⊆ s or s ⊆ t}, the "subtree with stem s". For a set A ⊆ [T ], the game on T with payoff A, denoted G(A; T ), is played by two players, I and II, who alternate choosing elements of X,
with the requirement that x 0 , . . . , x n ∈ T for all n. If a terminal node is reached, the last player to have made a move wins; otherwise, we obtain an infinite play x ∈ [T ], and Player I wins the play if x ∈ A; otherwise, Player II wins.
A strategy for I in a game on T is a subtree σ ⊆ T so that whenever s ∈ σ has even length, there is a unique x ∈ X so that s x ∈ T ; and if s ∈ σ has odd length and s x ∈ T , then also s x ∈ σ (a strategy for I puts no restrictions on moves by II). Note that due to the presence of terminal nodes in the tree, I needn't have a strategy at all. Whenever it is more convenient to do so, we identify a strategy with the induced partial function σ : T X assigning an even-length position to the unique next move in σ. We let Strat I (T ) denote the set of strategies for Player I in T , and Strat * I (T ) is the set of partial strategies,
where here T k = {s ∈ T | |s| < k}. Analogous definitions are made for Player II, and we let Strat * (T ) denote the space of all partial strategies (for both players) in T .
We say x ∈ [T ] is compatible with (or according to) a strategy σ if x ∈ [σ]; for y ∈ X <ω , we let σ * y denote the unique play compatible with σ where the opposing player plays the elements of y (if such exists). A strategy σ is winning for Player I (Player II) in G(A; T ) if every play according to σ belongs to A ([T ] \ A). If Player I has such a winning strategy, we say briefly that Player I wins G(A; T ). A game G(A; T ) is determined if one of the players has a winning strategy. For a pointclass Γ, Γ -DET denotes the statement that G(A; ω <ω ) is determined for all A ⊆ ω ω in Γ. We assume the reader is familiar with Martin's inductive proof of Borel determinacy as presented in e.g. [13] . In particular, we take as fundamental the technical concept of an unraveling, reviewing only briefly the relevant definitions and result. similarly for τ ∈ Strat * II (T ) (with ψ(τ 2m+1) = ψ(τ ) 2m+1 for all m). (iii) (Lifting property.) For σ ∈ Strat * (T ), if s ∈ ψ(σ) then there is t ∈ σ with π(t) = s; and whenever x ∈ [S], if x is compatible with ψ(σ), then there is some y ∈ [T ] compatible with σ so that π(y) = x. We say a covering unravels a set
The coherence condition (ii) allows us to regard ψ as a continuous function ψ : Strat(T ) → Strat(S) on the space of full strategies. Note by the lifting property (iii) that if σ ∈ Strat(T ) is a winning strategy in G(π −1 (A); T ), then ψ(σ) is winning in G(A; S) (for the same player). In particular, if A can be unraveled then G(A; S) is determined.
Martin showed that the members of any countable collection of closed sets can be simultaneously unraveled. So if A is a Σ can be carried out in rudimentarily closed models of "H(|S| + ) exists and is wellordered". However, the tree T obtained is on a set of higher type than S, and in the setting in which we work, Strat * (T ) will be a proper class. This presents two related difficulties: First, the proof of determinacy of the unraveled game on T becomes rather more delicate; and second, the winning strategy obtained may be a proper class, and we will nonetheless want to apply the unraveling map ψ to it. We will see that both difficulties are taken care of by certain features of the unraveling of closed sets.
We begin by isolating a locality property of Martin's unraveling. Suppose τ ∈ Strat * II (T ); for q ∈ T with |q| even, set τ q = τ q (|q| + 2) = {r ∈ τ | r ⊆ q or q ⊆ r, and |r| < |q| + 2}.
That is, τ q is just the fragment recording replies by τ to legal moves by Player I at q. Let us say ψ is local if whenever p ∈ ψ(τ ) with |p| odd, there is some finite sequence q 0 , . . . , q n−1 of positions in T so that
• |q i | is even for all i < n.
• π(q i ) ⊆ p for all i < n.
•
(And analogously for σ ∈ Strat * I (T ).) Locality may be regarded as a strengthening of the coherence condition (ii); it states that ψ(τ )(p) depends not on all of τ (|p| + 2), but only on its replies to one-step extensions of a certain finite list of positions in T which project to initial segments of p.
Definition 4.2. Let M be a set and S a tree. We say a triple T, π, ψ is an M -covering if ψ is local, and T, π, ψ satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.1, except the domain of ψ is only required to consist of those strategies σ with σ q ∈ M for all q ∈ σ of the appropriate length.
The notions of locality and M -unraveling allow us to cope with the second difficulty alluded to above: Later, we work in a model M where we need to apply ψ to a strategy τ that is only a definable class in M . Nonetheless, we will have that each of the fragments τ q with q ∈ τ belongs to M . If T, π, ψ is an M -covering, then by locality of ψ, the image ψ(τ ) is well-defined. (We remark that we have not relaxed the lifting property (iii) of Definition 4.1; in particular, it holds true of an M -covering for all plays x ∈ [ψ(τ )], regardless of whether x belongs to M .)
For the first mentioned difficulty, it will be crucial that the unraveling tree T is "one-sided," in the sense that only Player I's moves in the game on T are of higher type than those in the game on S. This one-sidedness is central to our arguments and, it seems, has not previously been isolated for uses in the literature, though it is obtained in the constructions of [6] , [11], [13] . Let us say a tree T in which I plays moves in X and II plays moves in Y is a tree on X, Y . The following can be gleaned from a careful reading of the proof of Borel determinacy in [13] . Theorem 4.3 (Martin) . Suppose X, S, M are sets with X, S ∈ M , S a tree on X, and M a transitive model of "H(|X| + ) exists and is well-ordered"; suppose further that {S n } n∈ω is a sequence in M of subtrees of S. Then there is a triple T, π, ψ so that
In the situation of this section, X = ω and S = ω <ω , so the unraveling tree T is (isomorphic to) a tree on P(ω), ω. Since II's moves are in ω, I's strategies are countable objects. The upshot is that if H(ω 1 ) exists, then Strat I (T ) is a set, and we can bound quantification over strategies for I, thus keeping the complexity of formulae low.
The following is an abstract form of Davis's Lemma towards Σ 0 3 -Determinacy, stated for trees on P(X), X. It includes some technical assumptions on X since we do not in general assume the Axiom of Choice. Here a quasistrategy W for Player II is defined similarly to a strategy but dropping the uniqueness condition on moves by II; so if s ∈ W has odd length, then there is some (not necessarily unique) x ∈ X with s x ∈ W . Lemma 4.4. Let X be a transitive set so that Π 1 -RAP(X) holds, and suppose H(|X| + ) exists. Assume X can be wellordered and that DC P(X) holds; further assume that there is a uniform ∆ 0 -definable coding of X <ω by elements of X, as well as elements of P(X)
X by P(X). Let T be a tree on P(X)
• Player I does not win G(A; W ).
Proof. In the event (2) holds, we say p is good (relative to A, B, T ). Notice that goodness of p is Σ 1 in parameters; for this, it is important that moves for II come from X, so that strategies for Player I, who plays in P(X), can be coded by subsets of X. We assume (2) fails for some p and show (1) must hold. So suppose p ∈ T is not good; using our canonical coding we can reflect this Π 1 statement to an admissible set N with X ∈ N ; since ω-sequences in P(X) are coded by elements of P(X), DC P(X) is Π 1 in parameters, so we can further assume this choice principle holds in N . This move to an admissible set is our use of the main strength assumption of the lemma, namely Π 1 -RAP(X).
So work in N . By an abuse of notation we prefer to refer to N 's versions of the relevant objects A, B, T by the same names. Since B is Π ; that is, there are sets U n ⊆ T so that for all n, D n = {x ∈ T | (∃i)x i ∈ U n }. Adjusting the sets U n as necessary, we may assume that each U n contains only nodes with odd length ≥ n.
We now define an operator Γ : P(T ) → P(T ) as follows. Fix Y ⊆ T . For n ∈ ω, let T Y n be the tree {s ∈ T | (∀i < |s|)s i / ∈ U n \ Y }. Then let Γ(Y ) = {q ∈ T | (∃n) Player I does not win G(A; T Y n ) from q}. The reason we truncate the tree following minimal odd-length nodes in U n \ Y is that we will be considering an auxiliary game where Player I is trying to enter the open set D n while avoiding Y ; the auxiliary game on T Y n ends when a node in U n \ X is reached, and in this case, Player I is the winner, because the length of the node reached is odd by the way we defined U n .
Note that the definition of Γ is such that "x ∈ Γ(Y )" is ∆ 0 in parameters; this is because H(|X| + ), and hence Strat I (T ), is a set (this is where we use "one-sidedness": T is a tree on P(X), X, so strategies for Player I are essentially functions f : X <ω → P(X), and so are in H(|X| + )). Now define recursively sets G α ⊆ T for all α ∈ ON, by
Note KP gives us enough transfinite recursion to ensure that the sets G α exist for all ordinals α; for this it is important that the operator Γ is ∆ 0 . Note also that Γ is a monotone operator (i.e., if Y ⊆ Y then Γ(Y ) ⊆ Γ(Y )), and therefore the sets G α are increasing.
Claim 4.5. If q ∈ T belongs to G α for some α, then q is good.
Proof. The proof is by induction on α. So suppose q, α are such that α is least with q ∈ G α+1 . Let n 0 be the least witness to this, so that I doesn't win G(A;
, which exists by definition of W . (Note that the existence of this extension of σ requires a use of DC P(X) , to choose the strategies Player I switches to.) But this contradicts the assumptions on q and n 0 . If on the other hand r ∈ U n0 for some r compatible with σ, then r ∈ G α , so by inductive hypothesis and definition of the quasistrategy W , W r witnesses the goodness of r. But that means I doesn't have a winning strategy in G(A; W r ); again, σ cannot be winning for I.
Since we have (in N ) that p is not good, we get p / ∈ G ∞ := α∈ON G α . Note that since we do not have Σ 1 -Comprehension in N , G ∞ may not be a set; indeed, if G α = G α+1 for all α, then G ∞ must be a proper class, by admissibility.
Proof. Since G ∞ needn't be a set, we should say what we mean by Γ(G ∞ ): This is the class of q ∈ T so that for some n, I doesn't win G(A; T G∞ n ) from q. Expanding our definition, this is the same as
This statement is Σ 1 , because x i ∈ G ∞ is Σ 1 (it is the statement (∃α)x i ∈ G α , and the relation s ∈ G α is ∆ 1 as a relation on T × ON), and all other quantifiers are bounded (since Strat I (T q ) and [σ] are sets from the point of view of N ). Suppose q ∈ Γ(G ∞ ). Then by Σ 1 -Collection applied inside the admissible N , there is a bound α on ordinals witnessing the "x i ∈ G ∞ " clause in the above statement, for various σ, x. That is, q ∈ Γ(G α ) ⊆ G ∞ ; so Γ(G ∞ ) ⊆ G ∞ . The reverse inclusion is trivial. Using this stabilization of the operator Γ we describe a winning strategy for I in G(A; T p ). Since p / ∈ G ∞ = Γ(G ∞ ), we have for all n that I wins G(A; T G∞ n ) at p. Let σ 0 witness this for n 0 = 0. Have I play according to σ 0 from the initial position. Now suppose strategies σ i , n i have been defined; if at any point in the strategy σ i I reaches a position p i with p i ∈ U ni \ G ∞ , then I wins G(A; T G∞ n ) from p i for every n, since p 0 / ∈ G ∞ . Let n i+1 be least so that no initial segment of p i is in U ni+1 (such exists because of the way we defined the U n ). Let σ i+1 be winning for I in G(A; T G∞ ni+1 ), and have I continue according to this strategy. Any infinite play against the strategy σ so defined must either enter the sets U 0 , U 1 , U 2 , . . . one by one, thus belonging to B = n∈ω D n , or else the play avoids U n \ G ∞ for some least n; but then the play is compatible with σ n , so must belong to A.
Some remarks regarding definability are in order. The inductive construction of Player II's goodness-witnessing quasistrategies was uniform, so no choice was required. The same cannot be said of Player I's winning strategy; at the very least, DC P(X) is needed to select the various σ n , and even if N possesses a ∆ 1 -definable wellordering of H(|X| + ), the definition of σ will (in general) be Σ 2 , so the strategy needn't be a set in N . However, we are able to define the strategy over N from the point of view of our model of Π 1 -RAP(X), using DC P(X) .
We claim that the strategy σ we have described is winning (in V ) in G(A; T p ) (where now T is the full tree, rather than its restriction to N ). Note first that σ really is a strategy in the true T , since II's moves are in X, and so N 's version of T is closed under moves by II.
Suppose x ∈ [T p ] is according to σ. Then x i ∈ N for all i. If for some n the play never enters U n \ G ∞ , then x must be according to some σ n ∈ N . We have N is admissible, A is Borel, and σ n is winning in G(A; T G∞ n ) in N . So by absoluteness, x ∈ A.
So suppose x enters U n \ G ∞ for every n. Then x ∈ n∈ω D n = B ⊆ A. Either way, we have any play x compatible with σ is in A, so we have that σ is winning in G(A; T p ). That is, case (1) of the lemma holds. ∈ B k for all k, hence x / ∈ A. A strategy τ for II is easily obtained by refining W , choosing a single successor node at each position of odd length (recall II's moves are in ω). Notice that the strategy τ is ∆ 1 -definable in M , but may not be an element of M . However, we have for each q ∈ τ with |q| = 2k that τ q ∈ M , since τ q is just a refinement of W q k . We may thus use the fact that T, π, ψ is an M -covering to conclude that the strategy τ = ψ(τ ) is well-defined; what is more, this strategy τ is ∆ 1 -definable in M by ∆ 1 -definability of τ combined with the final clause of Theorem 4.3.
We claim τ wins G(A; ω <ω ) for II in V . Suppose towards a contradiction that x ∈ A is a play in ω ω compatible with τ . Then using the lifting property of the M -unraveling, we have a play y ∈ [T ] (though possibly / ∈ M ) so that y is compatible with τ , and π(y) = x (in particular, y ∈ π −1 (A) =Ā). Then y ∈ B k for some k. Now τ on T y 2k is a refinement of W We would like to remove the uses of Choice in the previous theorems. One way is to proceed as in Hurkens' [6] , proving "quasi-determinacy" of Borel games, which implies full determinacy for games on ω; alternately we may work in L so that Choice is available, and then use Shoenfield absoluteness to show the strategies of L are winning in V (both of these approaches are detailed in Chapter 7 of [13] ). By Proposition 3.6, we may adopt the latter approach. We obtain
, and suppose θ is the least ordinal such that L θ |= Π 1 -RAP. Then either I wins G(A; ω <ω ) as witnessed by a strategy σ ∈ L θ , or else II has a winning strategy τ that is ∆ 1 -definable over L θ .
In particular, it is provable in KP that the existence of a transitive model of Π 1 -RAP implies Σ As a warm-up to help orient the reader and introduce the structure of our lower bound arguments, we first present a proof that ZF Definition 5.2. Let T be a collection of sentences in the language of set theory. We say a structure M in the language of set theory is T -small if it satisfies V =L + KP + Infinity + all sets are countable
Suppose Σ is (the set of codes for) a complete consistent theory extending the displayed theory above. There is a unique (up to isomorphism) minimal model M of Σ, defined as follows. Let
where φ i is some standard enumeration of formulae with one free variable in the language of set theory, and σ denotes the Gödel number of a sentence σ.
Then ≡ is an equivalence relation; we define a relation ε on the equivalence classes by setting
It is easy to check this is well-defined. Note that M has standard ω if and only if
This is a Π In order to make the rest of the winning condition easier to parse, we will typically quantify over sets such as P(ω)
MI rather than ω, and will frequently compress the Π 0 1 condition "i codes a real x ∈ M I and j codes a real y ∈ M II so that x = y" as simply "x = y", with the hope that this will make the intended meaning clearer. For example, we write (∀x ∈ P(ω) MII )(∃y ∈ P(ω) MI )x = y regarding this as an abbreviation for
We condense this further as "P(ω) MII ⊆ P(ω) MI ", which we see is a Π 0 3 condition of f I , f II . In what follows, we typically omit mention of f I , f II , which are allowed parameters in all our complexity calculations, and simply say the relation is Π 0 3 . Claim 5.3. Suppose M I , M II are ω-models, and let x ∈ P(ω)
MII . Then
Proof. The statement that there exists a real in M II \ M I is Σ 0 3 , as the previous discussion shows. Once a code for such a y has been fixed, the question of whether (y < L x) MII holds is decided by the theory of M II , hence recursive in f II .
We may now finish giving our winning condition. If both M I , M II are ZF − -small ω-models, then Player I wins G 0 if any of the following hold:
There is a real in M I ∩ M II that codes a wellorder in M II , but codes an illfounded linear order in M I .
P(ω)
MII \ P(ω) MI is nonempty and has no < MII L -least element. Note that if either (2) or (3) hold, then M II is illfounded. By the remarks above, (1) and (2) = ω). So σ cannot be winning for Player I. Next, Player II has no winning strategy in L β0 . For if τ were such a strategy, we again set α minimal so that τ ∈ L α and α is admissible, and have Player I play f I = Th(L α ). Let M II be the model τ responds with. We claim M II is illfounded. For if M II is wellfounded, then M II = L β for some β. If β ≤ α, then Player I wins by condition (1); and if β > α, then τ, f I both belong to L β , in which case L β can compute its own theory, f II , again contradicting ZF − -smallness of M II . So we have M II illfounded, and the same argument shows wfo(M II ) ≤ α.
Since we assumed τ was winning for Player II, there can be no codes for nonstandard ordinals of M II that belong to L α . But then by overspill (Lemma 2.5), the set of nonstandard codes not in M I is nonempty with no < MII L -least element; that is, (3) holds, and I wins the play, a contradiction.
We have shown L β0 does not satisfy Σ − -smallness of the models above was the fact that if α is the wellfounded ordinal of a ZF − -small ω-model, then new reals are constructed cofinally in L α , and we can apply overspill. We can carry this a bit further. Let T = KP + "P(ω) exists", and consider the game G 1 with the winning condition unchanged, except we require both players to play T -small ω-models.
is admissible, and must satisfy "all sets are countable." We therefore will have new reals constructed cofinally in L wfo(M) , and the overspill argument in the last paragraph of the proof of Claim 5.4 applies. So we have established KP + "P(ω) exists" Σ 0 4 -DET. Of course, at the level of Π 1 -RAP, there are many admissible models of "P(ω) exists", so our winning condition will have to be more elaborate. Our ability to identify overspill in M II in a Π condition that will identify nonstandard ordinals in a similar fashion when M II is only assumed to be Π 1 -RAP-small. The desired condition is given by Lemma 5.6 ; the next definition is the first step towards this lemma.
Let (T) denote the sentence P(ω) exists, and every tree T on P(ω) is either ranked or illfounded.
Recall θ is the least ordinal so that L θ |= Π 1 -RAP; by Corollary 3.4 and Theorem 3.5, it is also least so that L θ |= (T). In order to simplify slightly the remaining arguments, we work with (T) instead of Π 1 -RAP. Note that ω · θ = θ, so that L θ = J θ ; also, L θ |="ω 1 is the largest cardinal," and ρ , then L α satisfies KP + "P(ω) exists", and since every sequence of reals in L belongs to L α , we have L α |= (T), so that θ exists. We may therefore assume that all ordinals are countable in L; in particular, there are unboundedly many α so that L α is admissible and projects to ω (N.B. the remarks following Theorem 2.2).
We define a game G with Π 0 4 winning condition, and argue that G cannot be determined. The game proceeds as follows: players I and II play reals f I , f II , respectively, coding the theories of (T)-small ω-models M I , M II ; if f I does not code such a model, Player I loses, and similarly for f II and Player II.
is defined as the least ρ so that x ∈ J ρ+ω . Working in M II , suppose x ∈ P(ω), and inductively define
|= "ω 1 exists and (∃T ∈ J δ+ω ) T is a tree on P(ω) that is neither ranked nor illfounded," if such exists; undefined otherwise.
We stress that this definition is internal to M II . Thus if M II has standard ω and δ(0, x) exists, then δ(k, x) is a strictly descending sequence of ordinals, so is finite. The fact that (T) fails in every level of M II implies that the smallest element of δ(k, x) is ω
, then there is some unique k so that δ(k + 1, x) is wellfounded but δ(k, x) is nonstandard. By the defining property of δ(k + 1, x), there is some tree T ∈ J δ(k+1,x)+ω ⊂ L wfo(MII) that is neither ranked nor illfounded in J δ(k,x) , hence neither ranked nor illfounded in L wfo(MII) . The latter set is admissible, so T is in fact illfounded, and a branch through T is definable over L wfo(MII) . We exploit this fact in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6. There is a Σ 0 3 relation R(k, γ, x) such that if f I , f II are theories determining (T)-small ω-models M I , M II , respectively, so that M I is wellfounded, and x is the < MII L -least element of P(ω) ∩ (M II \ M I ), then we have the following:
Note that when we assert "R is a Σ 0 3 relation (on ω × M II 2 )" this should be understood to mean that the corresponding relationR ⊆ ω
We shall give the proof of Lemma 5.6 shortly. For now, we use the lemma to finish defining the game G, and to prove Theorem 5.1. Suppose I, II play consistent theories f I , f II determining (T)-small ω-models M I , M II , respectively. Player I wins if (∃x ∈ P(ω) ∩ M I ∩ M II )x codes a wellorder of ω in M II , but not in M I .
(As before, this implies illfoundedness of M II .) Otherwise, I wins just in case the following holds:
Here < Lex is the lexicographic order on the product (ω, ∈) × (ON MII , ∈ MII ).
Condition (1) states that if P(ω)
MII \ M I is nonempty, then either it has no < MII L -least element, or taking x to be < MII L -minimal, the set of k, γ such that R(k, γ, x) holds is nonempty and has no < Lex -least element. In particular, if (1) holds and P(ω)
MII \ M I is nonempty, then M II is illfounded.
Claim 5.7. Assuming θ does not exist, I does not win G.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that σ is a winning strategy for I in G. Applying Shoenfield absoluteness (which is provable in KPI 0 ), we may assume σ ∈ L. Let α be the least admissible ordinal so that σ ∈ L α . Then L α projects to ω and satisfies "all sets are countable". Since θ does not exist, we also have L α satisfies (∀ξ)L ξ |= (T). Let f II be the theory of L α , so that M II = L α . Let M I be the model that σ replies with.
Since M II is wellfounded, there cannot be any real in M II \ M I , since the < Lleast such would be a witness to failure of (1). So P(ω)
MII ⊆ M I . In particular, σ ∈ M I , and we can't have Th(M II ) ∈ M I , since then Th(M I ) = σ * f II ∈ M I , contradicting the fact M I projects to ω. So (2a) fails, and (2b) must hold; in particular, P(ω) MI = P(ω) MII . This implies M I = M II , since both models satisfy "all sets are countable", and we again have the contradiction Th(M I ) ∈ M I , since in this case f II is just copying the play by σ. We have that (1) ∧ (2) must fail, so σ cannot be a winning strategy for I.
Claim 5.8. Assuming θ does not exist, II does not win G.
Proof. As before, assume for a contradiction that τ ∈ L is a winning strategy for II in G. Let α be admissible with τ ∈ L α and L α projecting to ω; again, L ξ |= (T) for all ξ ∈ α, since θ does not exist. Let f I be Th(L α ), so M I = L α , and suppose τ replies with model M II .
We claim wfo(M II ) ≤ α. For otherwise, we would have τ ∈ M I ∈ M II , so that Th(M II ) = τ * Th(M I ) ∈ M II , a contradiction to the fact that M II projects to ω.
Suppose wfo(M II ) = α. If M II is wellfounded, then M I = M II , so that (1) holds vacuously and (2) holds via (2b), a contradiction to τ being winning for II. So M II is illfounded. By overspill, there are countable codes for nonstandard ordinals in M II , and there is no < MII L least such; since II wins the play, none of these codes can belong to M I . But then (1) holds via (1a), and (2) holds vacuously, again a contradiction.
So we must have wfo(M II ) < α. Again M II cannot be wellfounded, for then (1) holds vacuously and (2) holds via (2a). Since M II is illfounded, there is some x ∈ P(ω) MII \ P(ω) MI . Since (1a) fails, we can let x be the < MII L -least such. We must have L MII rank L (x) |= "ω 1 exists", and by minimality of x, this ω 1 is standard and contained in M I . It follows that δ(0, x) exists, and there is a unique k so that δ(k, x) is nonstandard and δ(k + 1) is wellfounded. In particular, R(k, γ, x) holds for any nonstandard γ < δ(k, x) by (B) of Lemma 5.6. And by (A) of the same Lemma, R(k , γ , x) cannot hold for any k , γ with k < k. But then (1b) holds, contradicting that II wins the play.
Let T ∈ H be a tree. If T is ranked in M , then the same holds in H since H ≺ 1 M . Otherwise {s ∈ T | T s is not ranked in H} is a subtree of T with no terminal nodes, and this belongs to M by ∆ 0 -Comprehension. It follows that there is a branch through T in M , so such must belong to H, again by Σ 1 -elementarity. But then H = L M α is a model of (T), contradicting our assumption on M .
Thus in the models we work with, we can talk about uncountable objects by taking images of countable ordinals by h 1 .
We define the Σ 0 3 relation R(k, γ, x) to be the conjunction of the following:
Before proceeding with the proof, we feel obligated to provide some discussion motivating our definition of the relation R(k, γ, x). Suppose, as in the assumptions of the lemma, that x is < MII L -least in P(ω) ∩ (M II \ M I ), and that M I is wellfounded. Note that then J wfo(MII) is a model of KP + "ω 1 exists".
To define a relation R 0 (γ, x) that holds precisely of those γ that are nonstandard ordinals of M II , a natural first attempt is to state that R 0 (γ, x) holds if γ < rank L (x) MII , and there is an ordinal β of M I so that J 1 , and so γ is illfounded; but it can happen that β is strictly larger than wfo(M II ), in which case the hull of X in J β could collapse to a smaller ordinal than wfo(M II ), so that γ may be standard. This is where the trees come in: if γ is truly nonstandard, then there will be an illfounded tree T ∈ J MI β ∩ J MII γ which J MII γ believes is wellfounded, but which is neither ranked nor illfounded in J β . By admissibility of J β , then, there is a branch through T in J β+ω ⊆ M I . The idea is to use this tree T to help us identify the ordinal wfo(M II ). The existence of T is asserted by parts (i) and (ii) of condition (2e).
However, we again do not have enough quantifiers to enforce full equality trees T ∈ M I and T ∈ M II , and can only insist that they agree on J β ∩ J γ as in part (iii) of (2e). Again minimality of x ensures T ⊆ T , but possibly T ⊆ T , and the branch through T in M I may not, in fact, be a branch through T . This is the point of defining the ordinals δ(k, x): If R(k, γ, x) and the assumptions of the lemma hold, then J δ(k+1,x)+ω is contained in the image of J β under the embedding of part (c); and if k is minimal so that R(k, γ, x) holds, we must have δ(k, x) nonstandard. Under our assumptions on M I , M II and x, the only β ∈ ON MI that could witness R(k, γ, x) for this k is wfo(M II ), since a larger ordinal would already contain a branch through (any tree in M I extending) T , where T witnesses the defining property of δ(k + 1, x) in M II . Since J β embeds onto an initial segment of J MII γ , we have that γ is nonstandard. Let us now note that the relation R(k, γ, x) is Σ 
which is clearly Π 0 2 (recall "z = z" is Π 0 1 and internal statements are recursive in the codes). Re-envisioning the statement of R(k, γ, x) appropriately, it is now easy to check that it is Σ 0 3 . We now prove that R(k, γ, x) is as desired. So let M I , M II and x ∈ M II satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 5.6, namely, that M I , M II are ω-models projecting to ω and satisfying KP, V = L, "all sets are countable" and "θ does not exist"; that M I is wellfounded, and that x is minimal in P(ω) ∩ (M II \ M I ). To prove (A), suppose k ∈ ω and γ ∈ ON MII are such that R(k, γ, x) holds. We need to show δ(k + 1, x) is wellfounded.
Let β ∈ ON MI witness (2) in the definition of R, with t ∈ P(ω) ∩ J be the trees whose existence is asserted in clauses (i),(ii) of (2e). There is a real y computable from t so that y codes tuples η in M I and η ∈ M II with h
Suppose towards a contradiction that M II is illfounded below δ(k + 1, x). Fix a sequence α n | n ∈ ω of ordinals α n of M II so that α 0 = δ(k + 1, x) and (α n+1 ∈ α n ) MII for all n. Inductively, fix tuples ξ n ∈ ω Jγ 1 in M II , as follows:
1 (the reverse inequality is impossible by our minimality assumption on x). Let α = wfo(M II ) and let T ∈ M I , T ∈ M II be the trees witnessing (i) and (ii), respectively, in (2e). T is a tree on P(ω)
Jγ ⊆ M I , so by (iii) of (2e), we have T ∩ (P(ω) Jγ ) <ω = T . Now, since J MII δ(k,x) |= "T is neither ranked nor illfounded" and α ⊆ δ(k, x), we must have that T ∈ J α and J α |= "T is neither ranked nor illfounded" (since being either ranked or illfounded is Σ 1 and would reflect from J α to J MII δ(k,x) ). But J α is admissible, so there is a branch through T , hence through T , definable over J α . Since α < ω J β 1 , we must have that T is illfounded in J β . But this contradicts (i) of (2e). This contradiction completes the proof of Lemma 5.6.
Although we have only referred to the lightface Σ is obtained in a manner similar to that in the inductive proof of Theorem 1.1 (see [11] ). The most significant modification to those arguments involves the identification of the correct higher analogues of Π 1 -RAP and (T).
Definition 6.1 (Π 1 -RAP α ). Let α < ω CK 1 . Π 1 -RAP α denotes the theory consisting of "P α (ω) exists" together with the axioms of the schema Π 1 -RAP(P α (ω)).
In particular, Π 1 -RAP α entails the existence of P α+1 (ω), and any Π 1 statement in parameters from P α+2 (ω) can be reflected to an admissible set M with P α (ω) ⊂ M . Note that Π 1 -RAP is the same as Π 1 -RAP 0 . The following is the general form of Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose M is a transitive model of "H(|P α (ω)| + ) exists" + Π 1 -RAP α , and that M has a wellordering of P α+1 (ω). Let A ⊆ ω ω be Σ 0 1+α+3 . Then either I wins G(A; ω <ω ) with a strategy in M , or II has a winning strategy in G(A; ω <ω ) that is ∆ 1 -definable over M .
Proof. As Martin [10] shows, the unraveling of closed sets can be iterated into the transfinite, taking inverse limits of the unraveling trees at limit stages. Precisely, assuming in M P α+1 (ω) exists and can be wellordered, there is an M -covering T, π, ψ that simultaneously unravels all Π 0 1+α sets, and so that T is a tree on P α+1 (ω), P α (ω), and this cover is definable over H(|P The remainder of the proof then is exactly like that of Theorem 4.7. If I doesn't win G(Ā; T ), then we can take W for II to be the common refinement at stage k of goodness-witnessing quasistrategies relative to the various B k (wherē A = k∈ω B k ). The desired strategy is ψ(τ ), where τ is any strategy for II refining W ; as before, M is sufficiently closed under local definitions involving τ to ensure ψ(τ ) is truly winning for I in G(A; T ).
For the lower bound argument, it will again be helpful to have a natural principle involving trees on P α+1 (ω) which is equivalent in models of V = L to Π 1 -RAP α . Consider a game tree T . The Gale-Stewart theorem applied to the game G([T ]; T ) tells us that either I has a strategy in T , or the game tree T is ranked for Player II, in the sense that there is a partial map ρ : T ON so that for every s of even length in the domain of ρ and every a with s a ∈ T , there is some b so that ρ(s a, b ) < ρ(s). We let (T) α denote the following special case of this fact, for α < ω CK 1 . Definition 6.3 ((T) α ). Suppose T is a tree on P α+1 (ω), P α (ω). Then either
• Player I has a strategy in T , or • The game tree T is ranked for Player II.
Although (T) 0 clearly implies (T), and it follows from what we've shown that in L, (T) implies Π 1 -RAP and hence (T) 0 , it's less clear that (T) 0 and (T) are equivalent in general (under, say, the weak base theory BST); we conjecture they are but have not been able to show it. Lemma 6.4. Suppose V = L and that P α+1 (ω) exists. Then Π 1 -RAP α holds if and only if (T) α holds.
Proof. Assume Π 1 -RAP α . Given a tree T on P α+1 (ω), P α (ω), suppose T is not ranked for II. Then this can be reflected to an admissible set M ; in an admissible structure, every closed game is either won by Player II (the open Player), or there is a definable winning strategy for Player I (the closed Player). Since if II won G([T ]; T ) in M this would easily furnish a rank function ρ for II, we must have a strategy for I that is definable over M , hence belongs to V , and is winning for I in the restriction of the game tree to M , hence (since P α (ω) ⊂ M ) winning for I in V .
Conversely, suppose (T) α holds; clearly, using the uniform definable bijection in L of P α (ω) with ω α , it is sufficient to show the version of Π 1 -RAP α holds involving parameters Q ⊆ P(ω α ). So let φ(Q) be Π 1 and true in V , with Q ⊆ P(ω α ). Let τ > ω α+1 be large enough that Q ∈ J τ . Consider a game tree T defined as follows: Player II plays ordinals ξ n < ω α . The moves of Player I are fragments f, g much like the nodes of the tree T used in the proof of Theorem 3.5; f is the characteristic function of a consistent theory in the language of set theory plus constant symbols t, q and a n , c n , d n for n ∈ ω; g assigns elements of τ ∪ P(ω α ) to certain of the constants a n .
The theory played by I is subject to the following rules: it must extend V = L + "P α+1 (ω) exists", and assert that q is a subset of P(ω α ) belonging to its J t (t an ordinal), and φ(q) must hold; the a n must act as Henkin constants for statements asserting the existence of elements of t ∪ P(ω α ); the ∈-ordering of the constants c n must agree with that of the ordinals ξ n played by II; and d n+1 < d n for all n. Moreover, the assignment of the Henkin constants a n must respect the order on t as asserted by the theory, as well as membership of the ξ n in subsets of ω α (so that f (#(c i ∈ a j )) = 1 iff ξ i ∈ g(j)) and of the elements of P(ω α ) in Q (so that f (#(a j ∈ q)) = 1 iff g(j) ∈ Q).
Since GCH holds, the tree T is evidently equivalent to one on P α+1 (ω), P α (ω). We claim Player I has a strategy in T . Otherwise, by (T) α , T is ranked for Player II. Let ρ be the rank function. Consider a play of the game where I plays the theory of L ρ(∅)+1 ; I interprets q by Q, the constants a n are interpreted by witnesses to the appropriate existential statements, the c n are interpreted as the ξ n played by II, and the d n are interpreted by ordinals furnished by the rank function (when the time comes to interpret the constant d n , we must be at a position p of length at least 2n, so interpret d n by ρ(p 2n)).
We have described how to obtain an infinite play for I; but this gives an infinite descending sequence of ordinals, a contradiction.
So Player I has a strategy σ in T ; then σ : 
is admissible, and satisfies φ(Q), thus witnessing the desired instance of Π 1 -RAP α . By a similar argument to that given in Proposition 3.6, we can use the equivalence of Π 1 -RAP α with (T) α to show that for transitive models M , Π 1 -RAP α reflects from M to L M ; thus we can eliminate the need for the Axiom of Choice in Theorem 6.2:
Theorem 6.6 (KPI 0 ). Σ 0 1+α+3 -DET implies θ α exists. Proof. As before, we define a Friedman-style game G with a Π 0 1+α+3 winning condition. Player I and II play reals f I , f II coding the characteristic functions of complete, consistent theories determining (T) α -small ω-models M I , M II , respectively. If this rule is broken, the winner is decided appropriately.
We need a lemma concerning the complexity of comparing elements of M I to those of M II . Essentially, it states that increasing the type of the elements by 1 increases the Borel rank of the equality relation by 1. The main complication is that sensibly comparing elements of P β+1 (ω) requires equality of P β (ω) between the levels in M I , M II where these elements are constructed.
Lemma 6.7. Let β < ω CK 1 . Let µ, ν ∈ ON ∪{ON} of M I , M II , respectively. Then
• The relation "P β (ω)
and L MII ν , respectively; and that the clause above holds. Then the relation "x = y" is Π 0 1+β . As usual, we mean that the relations in f I , f II and the codes for µ, ν, x, y have the stated complexity.
Proof. By induction on β. For β = 0, we regard the statement that "ω MI = ω MII " as asserting that both models have standard ω, which is Π 0 2 ; and we have already seen that if this is the case, then equality of reals x, y is Π 0 1 in the codes. If β = γ + 1, then the relation "P β (ω)
" is captured by
)(x = y),
and (∀x ∈ P γ+1 (ω)
By inductive hypothesis, the first clause is Π The proof at limits is similar, and in fact, since equality of P λ (ω) between the models is equivalent for limit λ to equality of P ξ (ω) for all ξ < λ, both relations in this case turn out to be Π 0 λ . (Note the importance of the fact that λ is assumed to be recursive, and the relations above are uniform in the codes.) We seek to describe the level of least disagreement of M II with M I . Previously, this was witnessed by the least constructed real of M II not belonging to M I ; in the present situation, we look for sets witnessing least disagreement of type β ≤ α, in the following sense: Definition 6.8. Suppose β < ω CK 1 and that x ∈ P β+1 (ω) MII . We say x witnesses disagreement at β if for some µ ∈ ON
(in particular, both models believe P β (ω) exists), and for every z ∈ P β+1 (ω)
MI
there is some u belonging to this common P β (ω) that is in the symmetric difference of x and z.
Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 6.7, the relation "x witnesses disagreement at β" is Σ 0 1+β+2 in the codes. Just as before, we require a means of identifying the height of wfp(M II ) in the event that L wfo(MII) satisfies "ω α+1 exists". The device is again a function that steps down incrementally from an ordinal to its ω α+1 , using failures of (T) α . Definition 6.9. Inside M II , suppose x ∈ P α+1 (ω). Put
if J rank L (x) |= "ω α+1 exists"; undefined otherwise; δ α (k + 1, x) =        δ least s.t.J δα(k,x) |= "ω α+1 exists and (∃T ∈ J δ+ω )T is a tree on P α+1 (ω), P α (ω) witnessing failure of (T) α " if such exists; undefined otherwise.
We have the following analogue of Lemma 5.6.
Lemma 6.10. There is a Σ 0 1+α+2 relation R α (k, γ, x) such that if M I , M II are (T) α -small ω-models, M I is wellfounded, L MII rank L (x) |= "ω α+1 exists", and x is the < MII L -least element of P α+1 (ω) witnessing disagreement at α, then:
(A) (∀k ∈ ω)(∀γ ∈ ON MII )R α (k, γ, x) → δ α (k + 1, x) is standard; (B) (∀k ∈ ω) if δ α (k, x) is nonstandard and δ α (k + 1, x) is wellfounded, then (∀γ ∈ ON MII )(R α (k, γ, x) ↔ (γ < δ α (k, x)) MII ∧ γ is nonstandard).
The definition of R α and the proof of the Lemma closely resemble those in Lemma 5.6, so we omit them; note though that in addition to the obvious modifications, we require of any β ∈ ON MI witnessing R α (k, γ, x) that
rank L (x) (which is Π 0 1+α+1 ) so that comparing codes for elements of ω α+1 makes sense. Observe now the engine making the lemma go is the fact that if T is a game tree in an admissible structure which does not have a ranking function for II, then there is a strategy for I (the closed player) defined over the admissible set. The role before played by the newly defined branch now belongs to this strategy.
We may now give the winning condition. Suppose a play f I , f II with term models M I , M II , respectively, is such that no rules have so far been broken. I wins the game if there are β ≤ α and sets z, z in
, respectively, so that
• z codes an ordinal in M II , but codes an illfounded linear order in M I . Call this condition ( * ) (and notice ( * ) is Σ 0 1+β+2 ). Otherwise, I wins just in case 1. (∀β ≤ α)(∀x ∈ P β+1 (ω) MII ) if x witnesses disagreement at β, then (a) (∃β ≤ α)(∃y ∈ P β +1 (ω) MII ) y witnesses disagreement at β and (rank L (y) < rank L (x)) MII ), or (b) (∃k, γ)R α (k, γ, x) ∧ (∀k, γ)[R α (k, γ, x) → (∃k , γ )R α (k , γ , x) ∧ k , γ < Lex k, γ ], and 2. P(ω) MII ⊆ M I implies (a) Th(M II ) ∈ M I , or (b) P(ω) MI ⊆ P(ω) MII .
That this game is Π 0 1+α+3 is by now a routine computation. We claim I has no winning strategy if θ α does not exist. For suppose σ is such; we can assume by wins via condition ( * ), a contradiction. So it must be that P(ω) MII ⊆ P(ω) MI , hence (2) holds vacuously. Now wfo(M II ) has a largest cardinal, say ω β for some β ≤ α + 1. If β ≤ α, then by overspill, there are nonstandard ordinals of M II coded by subsets of P β (ω). Since II wins the game (so in particular ( * ) fails), these cannot be coded by any element of P β+1 (ω) in M I . We thus obtain codes witnessing disagreement at β, and by overspill, there is no < MII L -least such; this witnesses (1) via (1a), a contradiction. If β = α + 1, on the other hand, then I wins the game via (1b) (here making use of Lemma 6.10). This contradiction completes the proof.
As before, relativizing to real parameters x produces a boldface result in a slightly weaker theory. It is interesting to note that game trees on P α+1 (ω), P α (ω) appear to be crucial on both sides of the argument, though they are used in very different ways. Though (T) α and Π 1 -RAP α are equivalent in levels of L, it is not clear whether this equivalence is provable in a more general setting, say, that of BST + DC. We are further led to wonder whether the (ostensibly weaker) axioms (T) α could replace Π 1 -RAP α as the essential ingredient in the proof of Lemma 4.4. §7. Borel determinacy and inductive definitions. For a pointclass Γ, o(Γ) is defined to be the supremum of lengths of inductive definitions obtained
